学术资讯中山大学哲学系(珠海)研讨生前沿讲座系列第十六讲…(中山大学学术排名)
中山大学哲学系（珠海）助理教授
哲学系（珠海）a486会议室
of the nature of experience have an advantage in this regard? in particular, might a view of sensory experience centred around a na?ve realist account of veridical perceptual experiences do better in accounting for the laws? it may seem that the na?ve-centric view runs into the same problem as representationalism when it comes to hallucinations. i argue that this is not the case. but there is real problem for the view, coming from perceptual illusions. however, it, too, can be solved. to that effect, i show that a na?ve realist account of illusory experiences distinctively predicts absolute limits on the degree to which an object’s appearance may distort its intrinsic character.
recommended reading:
adam pautz,
“experiences are representations” in nanay (ed.) (2021),
current controversies in philosophy of perception. routledge.
key topics:
-what is na?ve realism: 23-24
-what is intentionalism
(representationalism): 34-36
-the laws of appearance: 36-39
研讨生前沿讲座系列介绍：
文案｜ivan ivanov
修改｜汪俊豪
初审｜黄丹萍
审阅｜卢 毅
审阅发布｜屈琼斐
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